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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent , 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-
Petitioner. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992) which grants the Utah Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court 
of Appeals." Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
was granted on May 12, 1992. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen presents the 
following questions for review: 
I. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously apply a harmless 
error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed 
Case No. 910560 
Priority No. 14 
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error by directing a verdict in favor of Defendant/Respondent 
Smith•s Management Corporation ("Smith's")? 
A. Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the 
appellate court holds that the directed verdict was erroneously 
granted by the trial court? 
B. Even if a harmless error analysis is appropriate 
in such circumstances, is such an analysis appropriate in this 
case? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously classify 
foreseeability and, in essence, overrule a Utah Supreme Court 
case in holding that Jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but 
that the error was harmless? 
III. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously affirm the 
exclusion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and Utah Supreme Court cases? 
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this Court 
accords the lower court's statement of law, statutory 
interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference. The 
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991); City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules pertinent 
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of 
this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two 
year old woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's 
store located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah 
when a shoplifter, being pursued through the store by Smith's 
employees, collided with her, knocking her to the floor. (R. 
1242 at 5-6).1 
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's 
alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries. 
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed 
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that 
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies before 
apprehending Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that 
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies by chasing 
and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett after he ran from them. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). After presentation of all the evidence, Smith's 
counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on the grounds that 
Smith's failure to adequately train its employees and to deter 
Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be the proximate cause of 
All references are to the record page number. All 
transcripts and depositions are stamped with a record page number 
on the opening page. Because of confusion in the denomination of 
the transcripts (i.e. there are at least three transcripts labeled 
"Vol. IV"), transcript citations are given as "R. at " where 
the first number is the record page number of the transcript and 
the second number is the page number within the transcript volume 
e.g., R. 1243 at 50 denotes page 50 of the transcript volume 
labeled as record page 1243. 
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Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6). The trial judge 
granted Smith's motion. (R. 1216 at 7). The jury found that 
Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1198) 
(Addendum A). 
Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming: 
(1) that the trial court improperly granted the partial directed 
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be 
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to 
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and 
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony 
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of 
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett. The Court of Appeals 
issued an opinion affirming the trial court on October 29, 1991. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (Addendum B). The Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court committed error in granting the partial directed 
verdict. 820 P.2d at 489. However, the Court of Appeals then 
applied a harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's 
error was harmless. 820 P.2d at 490. The Court of Appeals also 
held that Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was 
harmless. 820 P.2d at 490. Finally, the Court of Appeals held 
the exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was 
harmless error and that the exclusion of testimony on the 
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apportionment of fault was proper. 820 P.2d at 491. This Court 
granted Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on 
May 12, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Mrs. Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two year old woman, 
routinely shopped at the Smith's store at 2100 South and 900 East 
in Salt Lake City. (R. 1242 at 5-6). Each week she usually 
cashed a check for herself and another for her husband at the 
store's customer service counter. (R. 1242 at 7). On March 2, 
1987, Mrs. Steffensen was in line at the customer service counter 
when the incident which resulted in her injuries occurred. (R. 
1242 at 9-14). 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered the store 
intending to shoplift beer and cigarettes. (R. 1243 at 6). Gary 
Canham, the store's front-end manager, observed Burnett shortly 
after Burnett took beer and cigarettes from the store's shelves 
(R. 1243 at 56). Canham suspected that Burnett might attempt to 
leave the store without paying for the items. (R. 1243 at 60-
61). Canham informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King manager, of 
the situation and the two watched Burnett. (R. 1243 at 60). 
Rather than deter Burnett through the use of eye contact or a 
greeting as mandated by Smith's written policies, Rompus instead 
played "cat and mouse" with Burnett by watching him while 
pretending to work. (R. 1244 at 131). 
As he walked toward the front of the store, Burnett believed 
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the managers were watching him and was deterred. (R. 1243 at 8-
9). Burnett, therefore, stood in a check-out line for a few 
minutes. (R. 1243 at 8-9). When Burnett thought that he was no 
longer being watched, he left the line and walked quickly toward 
the exit with the beer and cigarettes. (R. 1243 at 11). 
The two managers pursued Burnett and, after stopping him, 
asked him to accompany them to the store's office. (R. 1243 at 
12-13). As the three walked to the office, Rompus, in Burnett1s 
presence, called to another employee at the front of the store 
and told her to call the police. (R. 1244 at 137). As the group 
reached the office, Burnett dropped the beer and cigarettes, 
pushed Canham to the ground, and bolted toward the exit. Rather 
than allow Burnett to escape as Smith's own written policies 
required, Rompus grabbed Burnett's shirt and pants and was 
dragged on the ground for a few steps before releasing Burnett. 
(R. 1244 at 140). Rompus then yelled, "stop him - see if you can 
stop him" in an effort to get others to stop the now-fleeing 
Burnett. (R. 1244 at 140, 181). 
In response to Rompus1 call to action, Randall Achziger, a 
store bagger for Smith's, assumed a semi-crouched position he 
learned from playing football and attempted to stop Burnett. (R. 
1244 at 188). Burnett collided with Achziger. (R. 1244 at 196). 
Burnett bounced off of Achziger and into Mrs. Steffensen, 
knocking her to the ground. (R. 1244 at 196). Achziger, who had 
been knocked to the floor by the force of the collision, and 
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other Smith's employees then recaptured Burnett. 
The force of the collision knocked the elderly Mrs. 
Steffensen to the hard tile floor. (R. 1242 at 14). Her head 
violently struck the floor and she sustained severe injuries 
resulting in stroke-like symptoms which paralyzed the entire left 
side of her body. (R. 1242 at 19-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Steffensen first contends that the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that the trial court had erroneously granted 
Smith's motion for a partial directed verdict but that the Court 
of Appeals then erroneously applied a harmless error analysis. 
The Court of Appeals' application of a harmless error analysis 
resulted in that court holding that the erroneously directed 
verdict constituted harmless error. Mrs. Steffensen asserts that 
the application of such an analysis is unprecedented and 
incompatible with the standard of review for a directed verdict. 
Furthermore, even if a harmless error analysis is permissible in 
such cases, the court's conclusion that the error in this case 
was harmless is erroneous. 
Mrs. Steffensen next contends that the Court of Appeals 
misapplied the law on the issue of foreseeability. The court 
held that an instruction on the issue of foreseeability given by 
the trial court was erroneous but harmless. However, in reaching 
this conclusion, the court sub silentio overruled Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978). A correct analysis 
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indicates that the error was not harmless. 
Finally, Mrs. Steffensen asserts that the Court of Appeals 
misinterpreted Rule 704 of the Rules of Evidence in upholding the 
exclusion of expert testimony concerning the adequacy of Smith's 
training procedures and the apportionment of fault. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS 
ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED SMITHS MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
When the Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis 
after determining that the trial court erroneously granted the 
motion for a partial directed verdict, it decided an important 
question of state law not previously considered by this Court and 
it decided a question of state law in a way that conflicts with 
dozens of cases decided by this Court over a period of decades. 
In applying the harmless error standard, the Court of Appeals 
committed error. 
At trial Mrs. Steffensen had asserted two theories of 
negligence against Smith's. First, Mrs. Steffensen had contended 
that Smith's had been negligent by failing to train its employees 
to use techniques which would deter shoplifters and, 
alternatively, that Smith's employees failed to employ such 
techniques, prescribed by Smith's written policy manuals, to 
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deter Burnett.2 Second, Mrs. Steffensen asserted that Smith's 
was negligent in its actions following Burnett's escape. 
At the close of evidence, Smith's moved for a partial 
directed verdict, arguing that even if its employees had not been 
adequately trained in deterrence techniques and had failed to use 
such techniques in this case, the failure was not the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6). The trial 
court granted Smith's motion and instructed the jury that Smith's 
conduct before the detention of Burnett could not be considered: 
You have heard testimony regarding events 
that occurred prior to the time of the stop 
of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett. You are 
instructed that none of the actions of the 
Smith's employees prior to the stop and 
detention proximately caused plaintiff's 
injuries. 
Smith's employee manuals advocated the use of techniques 
designed to deter shoplifters. For example the manuals stated: 
Make sure that employees on the sales floor 
are greeting and making eye contact with 
customers, especially those who are acting 
suspiciously. 
Make use of the intercom system by calling for 
security from time to time. Very effective 
tool, it gives the potential shoplifter an 
uneasy feeling that security is in the store. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Addendum C) 
3 
In an extended footnote the Court of Appeals explained 
that while the trial judge had both granted a directed verdict and 
incorporated the ruling into the jury instructions, the trial 
judge's ruling was most "accurately characterized as a partial 
directed verdict." 820 P.2d at 486, n. 1. No one has alleged that 
the court's characterization is erroneous. 
9 
Therefore, you must not take this testimony 
into consideration when deliberating and 
making your decision. 
(R. 948) . 
On appeal Mrs. Steffensen asserted that the trial court 
improperly granted a partial directed verdict. After a lengthy 
discussion of proximate cause the Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court's ruling on the motion for partial directed verdict 
was erroneous and declared: 
There was probably sufficient evidence 
produced from which a reasonable juror could 
infer that Smith's failure to deter was a 
negligent act, as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
trained employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer's injury. 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489 (footnote omitted). However, after 
reaching this conclusion, the court applied a harmless error 
analysis and held that the trial court's error had been harmless. 
The court reasoned that "the jury must have concluded that 
either: (1) the post-apprehension negligence was too attenuated 
and remote from the injury to constitute the cause, or (2) Mr. 
Burnett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable superseding 
proximate cause of the injury." 820 P.2d at 490. The court 
concluded that the jury could not "have reached a different 
conclusion had it been allowed to consider acts Smith's 
performed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehending Mr. 
Burnett." 820 P.2d at 490. Therefore, the court concluded the 
error to be harmless. 
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A. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO A PARTIAL DIRECTED 
VERDICT WHICH HAD BEEN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
When the Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
erroneously granted a directed verdict, its subsequent 
application of a harmless error analysis was inconsistent with 
the required standard of review in such cases as previously 
applied by this Court. A directed verdict is only appropriate 
when a trial court is able to conclude that reasonable minds 
would not differ on the facts from the evidence presented. 
Management Comm. v. Grevstone Pines, Inc.f 652 P. 2d 896, 897-98 
(Utah 1982). Furthermore, in making its determination the trial 
court is required to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict is 
sought. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). An 
appellate court reviewing a directed verdict must apply the same 
standard as the trial court. Management Comm.f 652 P.2d at 898; 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 
(Utah 1982). Therefore, if the appellate court finds that there 
was a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences drawn 
therefrom that would allow reasonable minds to differ on the 
facts determined from the evidence and that would support a 
verdict in favor of the losing party, "the directed verdict 
cannot be sustained.1' Management Comm. , 652 P.2d at 898. 
A trial court is prohibited from considering the weight of 
the evidence in passing on a motion for directed verdict, 
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Cerritos Trucking Co,, 645 P.2d at 613, and the standard of 
review imposes the same limitation on the appellate court. The 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
jury. By holding that the trial court erred in granting a 
directed verdict, the appellate court has concluded that 
reasonable minds could differ on the facts from the evidence 
presented and that a verdict could have been entered for the 
losing party. 
In contrast, this Court has stated that harmless errors are 
"errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on 
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989).4 
When an appellate court holds that reasonable minds could 
differ on the evidence and a verdict could have been entered for 
the losing party, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, the 
appellate court is stating that the error is not inconsequential 
and that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome." Therefor, the basis necessary for an 
appellate court to find error is simply incompatible with a 
4
 State v. Verde is the case cited by the Court of Appeals 
to justify its harmless error analysis. However, Verde is not a 
civil case and does not involve a directed verdict. In fact, the 
quotation cited in the text and relied on by the Court of Appeals 
was part of a longer discourse on the meaning of the term "manifest 
injustice" under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c). 
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harmless error analysis. Entertaining a harmless error analysis 
in such a situation would be similar to considering a harmless 
error analysis in the case of an erroneously granted summary 
judgment; the required standard of review is inconsistent with a 
finding of harmless error. In both instances, once an appellate 
court applies its required standard of review and finds error in 
the direction of a verdict or the grant of summary judgment the 
standard of review precludes application of a harmless error 
analysis. 
A review of 40 years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court 
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted 
directed verdict to be harmless error. Cases in which a 
directed verdict has been erroneously granted are reversed and 
remanded. See e.g., Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 
801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989); Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685 
(Utah 1985); Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984); 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983); Management Committee 
v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982); 
Seecrmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). 
One commentator has noted the inapplicability of the 
harmless error standard to an erroneously granted directed 
verdict: 
The forty year period cited is an artificial limit 
imposed by Petitioner's counsel and has no significance. 
13 
Whenever the appellant introduces sufficient 
evidence to take his case to the jury, there 
exists the possibility that the jury might 
have found a verdict for him, had the error 
not intervened. Hence, in such a situation 
it would seem impossible for an appellate 
court to determine definitely that the 
verdict for the respondent was unaffected by 
the erroneous matter. . . . 
Only with such a standard as that set 
out above or to phrase it differently, 
disregarding the matter complained of, no 
reasonable jury could have come to any other 
verdict, can the appellate court validly 
assert that it is not usurping the function 
of the jury. For, unless the weight of the 
evidence is so overwhelming, no conclusive 
determination can be made as to the effect of 
the error on the verdict. The determination 
becomes rather that the verdict was not 
incorrect in spite of the error. Appellate 
courts that say this put themselves in the 
jury box. 
Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 450, 
458-59 (1947). See also J. Hoffman, Comparing the Standards for 
Granting Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict: Harville v. Goza, 33 Ala. L. Rev. 
23, 27 (1981) ("[A trial judge] also knows that reversal of a 
directed verdict will result in a new trial ... .") 
In this case the novel action of the Court of Appeals 
usurped the jury's function and effectively violated Mrs. 
Steffensen's right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 
10 of the Utah Constitution. The usurpation occurred despite the 
court's statement that a reasonable juror could have found for 
Mrs. Steffensen on the issue which the trial court took from the 
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jury. In rationalizing the application of the harmless error 
analysis, the Court of Appeals plainly substituted its judgment 
for that of the jury. In fact, the court conjectured that "the 
jury must have concluded ... ." 820 P.2d at 490. By doing so the 
Court of Appeals "put [itself] in the jury box." In noting the 
dangers of such expedient solutions another court stated: 
There is a temptation in a case such as 
this, where the evidence weighs heavily in 
one party's favor, to cut through the 
restraints imposed by those fundamental 
principles which protect the right of the 
opposite party to have a jury pass on his 
case. This is especially so if one is 
impatient with the delays the jury process 
entails. Although it may appear desirable in 
a particular case to relax the time-honored 
and hundred-of-times confirmed principles it 
cannot be done without undermining them. It 
is an old, legal truism that "hard cases make 
bad law." For a reviewing court to relax the 
long-settled standards of proof in a hard 
case would encourage further relaxation; it 
would be an invitation to trial judges to 
weigh evidence and determine credibility. 
Instead of the tried, sound, and clear-cut 
standards that now prevail there would be 
substituted indefinite and variable ones. 
This inevitably would lead to more summarily 
directed verdicts and to more appeals. 
Mesich v. Austin, 70 111. App. 2d 334, 217 N.E. 2d 574, 578 
(1966). 
The Court of Appeals should not have applied a harmless 
error analysis once it held that the trial court's direction of a 
verdict was erroneous. The Court of Appeals' application of such 
an analysis was reversible error. 
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B. EVEN IF A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATE 
IN A CASE OF AN ERRONEOUSLY DIRECTED VERDICT, THE 
ERROR IN THIS CASE WAS NOT HARMLESS. 
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals stated 
that Mrs. Steffensen introduced "substantial expert testimony" 
that deterrence prevents shoplifting and thus "promote[s] 
customer safety." 820 P.2d at 488. Furthermore, the court noted 
that "the experts testified that a retail store should also train 
its employees to use care when apprehending a shoplifter." 820 
P.2d at 488. These factors led to the court's conclusion that 
the trial court's ruling was incorrect and that there was 
"probably sufficient evidence produced from which a reasonable 
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter was a negligent 
act" and that "it would have been reasonably foreseeable to an 
adequately trained employee" that the decision to chase a 
shoplifter in a crowded store could lead to the injury of a 
customer. 820 P.2d at 489. (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals justified the error as harmless because 
the jury found that Smith's negligence was not the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries and the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the jury would not have changed its verdict on 
proximate cause. 820 P.2d 490. However, the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion is erroneous. 
The trial court, after granting Smith's motion for a partial 
directed verdict, instructed the jury that Smith's conduct prior 
to the stop of the shoplifter could not be considered. This 
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instruction eliminated all evidence concerning the value of 
deterrence in reducing shoplifting, all evidence concerning 
specific deterrence of the shoplifter in this case, all evidence 
concerning Smith's employees1 knowledge of the written store 
policy to let fleeing shoplifters escape, and all evidence 
concerning training of employees not to yell such things as "stop 
him - see if you can stop him." The jury could have concluded 
from any or all of the excluded evidence that there was a 
reasonable connection between Smith's acts or omissions and Mrs. 
Steffensen's injuries. See e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton 
on Torts, § 41 at 266 (5th ed. 1984). 
In each instance cited, Smith's conduct could reasonably be 
seen as the cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. For example, if 
Smith's employees had continued the specific deterrence of Mr. 
Burnett which forced him to stand in a check out line, he 
ultimately would have been forced to either purchase the items or 
leave them and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not have 
occurred. Similarly, if Smith's employees had adequate knowledge 
to allow fleeing shoplifters to escape, as per written store 
policy, Rompus would not have chased Burnett and yelled for other 
employees to stop him and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not 
have occurred. If employees had been trained to allow fleeing 
shoplifters to escape, the store employee who assumed the 
football stance may not have done so and Mrs. Steffensen's 
injuries would not have occurred. Thus, in each instance of 
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evidence kept from the jury's consideration, the jury could have 
found Smith's conduct to be the proximate cause of the injuries. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion to the contrary is an 
unsupported invasion of the province of the jury and should be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SUB SILENTIO OVERRULED A UTAH 
SUPREME COURT CASE IN ITS DECISION CONCERNING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32. GIVING THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Mrs. Steffensen claimed on appeal that the trial court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of foreseeability. 
The trial court gave the following instruction: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a customer 
which the defendant and its employees could 
have reasonably anticipated as the natural 
consequences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anticipate the 
particular injury which did occur. 
In determining what is foreseeable you 
must determine that the actions by Burnett 
were predictable by Smith's employees and not 
just a mere possibility. 
(R. 944) . Mrs. Steffensen argued that the instruction, 
Instruction No. 32, prevented the jury from finding that Smith's 
negligence caused her injuries. (Brief of Appellant at 41, Case 
No. 910210-CA). 
The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction at issue 
was erroneous because it improperly focussed on the actions of 
the specific shoplifter. 820 P.2d at 490. However, the court 
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applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that any error in 
the instruction was harmless because "[t]he question of 
foreseeability goes to the issue of negligence, and the jury 
found Smith's negligent." 820 P.2d at 490. By confining its 
analysis only to the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeals 
ignored case law from this Court and predetermined the outcome. 
While the court was theoretically correct in stating that 
foreseeability is related to negligence, the issue is not quite 
so clear or simple. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized a connection between foreseeability and both 
negligence and proximate cause. In Rees v. Albertson's. Inc., 
587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978), the Court stated: "What is 
necessary to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is 
that it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular 
accident would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an 
occurrence of the same general nature." (emphasis added) In 
its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals effectively 
overruled that portion of Rees and ignored the relationship of 
foreseeability and proximate cause. 
Support exists for the Rees position because foreseeability 
may be relevant to both proximate cause and negligence. See, 
e.g., W. Keaton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts. § 43 at 298 (5th 
ed. 1984) ("foreseeability in proximate cause means the same 
thing as in negligence; . . . the same considerations that 
determine the original culpability are to be used again to 
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determine liability for consequences."); 4 F. Harper, F. James & 
0. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 20.5 at 163 (2d ed. 1986). 
("Foreseeability does not mean the precise hazard or exact 
consequences that were encountered should have been foreseen. 
Upon this all are agreed whether they regard foreseeability as 
relevant only to the duty issue, or to questions of proximate 
cause as well.") See generally Green, Foreseeability in 
Negligence Law. 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961). Even the 
Restatement of Torts includes foreseeability in its proximate 
cause sections. See 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of 
Torts, § 20.5 at 168 (2d ed 1986) ("The formula chosen by the 
Restatement in its section on proximate cause, with its emphasis 
on what seems to be 'extraordinary' in the light of hindsight 
seems to abandon the foreseeability test. But careful analysis 
shows that it does not.") 
The quotation from Harper, James & Gray that 
"[f]oreseeability does not mean the precise hazard or exact 
consequences ... should have been foreseen" highlights the error 
in Instruction No. 32. The instruction erroneously requires the 
jury to find that Smith's could specifically predict Burnett's 
behavior. The instruction shifted the focus of the inquiry away 
from the question of whether Smith's negligence was the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. 
This Court faced a similar issue in Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed 
Co.. 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1954). In Glenn, the 
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defendant insisted that because a gravel slide was not the type 
anticipated, "nor had such a slide occurred within the history of 
the [defendant's] operations in this area, and because it is not 
precisely demonstrable that defendant's operations caused the 
slide, the defendant could not have foreseen the harm or the 
manner in which it occurred and should not be held liable." 265 
P.2d at 1015-16. This Court held: 
The fact that the defendant did not 
foresee the likelihood of such an accident is 
not controlling here, for it was warned that 
there was danger to the men working under the 
vertical bank. Negligence may be the 
proximate cause of damage even though the 
actor was not able to foresee the injury in 
the precise form in which it occurred, nor to 
anticipate the precise damage which would 
result from his negligence. 
265 P.2d at 1016. 
In this case Smith's made an argument similar to that of the 
defendant in Glenn which Instruction No. 32 erroneously 
bolstered. Smith's claimed that Burnett's attempted escape was 
unforeseeable as were its consequences, Mrs. Steffensen's 
paralyzing injuries. However, just as in Glenn, the focus should 
not have been on the precise form of situation or the damage 
which might result but rather on whether Smith's was aware of a 
general danger of the type encountered. In fact, Smith's own 
written policy manuals warned of such a danger: 
However, our company policy is that no 
employee is to take any action in the 
apprehension of a shoplifter which will bring 
harm to himself, to other employees or to 
customers. 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Addendum D) 
The most important thing to remember about 
apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not 
want anyone injured. There is nothing in the 
store that is worth a person getting hurt 
for. Use common sense, if the situation 
can't be properly controlled let the 
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license 
number. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Addendum C) 
Clearly, Smith's was aware of the potential danger from 
shoplifters. 
The error in Instruction No. 32, which Smith's characterized 
as "unfortunate" in its brief in the Court of Appeals, was not 
harmless. The instruction eviscerated Mrs. Steffensen's efforts 
to connect Smith's negligence to her injuries. When this 
instruction was coupled with the trial court's erroneously 
directed verdict, the jury was constrained to find that Smith's 
did not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The 
instruction and the directed verdict each deprived Mrs. 
Steffensen of her right to have the jury decide her case. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED RULE 704 OF THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE 
LAW IN UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. 
Charles Sennewald, a qualified expert in the field of retail 
store security, testified as an expert witness on behalf of Mrs. 
Steffensen. Mr. Sennewald testified regarding the standard of 
care in the apprehension of shoplifters and organizational 
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structure of Smith's. (R. 1245 at 318-333)• However, the trial 
court excluded testimony from Mr. Sennewald regarding the 
involvement of Smith's security administrators in the training of 
employees in the handling and deterrence of shoplifters. The 
trial court excluded the evidence because it concluded that 
Smith's failure to deter could not have been the proximate cause 
of the injury and therefore, it concluded such evidence was 
irrelevant. (R. 1245 at 335-42). The trial court also excluded 
evidence from Sennewald on the apportionment of fault between 
Smith's and Burnett. (R. 1245 at 361). 
The Court of Appeals held that, because of its resolution of 
the proximate cause issue, the ruling on the exclusion of 
evidence on training was harmless error. 820 P.2d at 491. The 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's exclusion of 
evidence with respect to the apportionment of fault was correct 
because such testimony would invade the province of the jury. 
820 P.2d at 491. 
Clearly, if this Court finds that a harmless error analysis 
was inappropriate on the causation/directed verdict issue, then 
the issue of the exclusion of expert testimony on training must 
be reevaluated because the evidence was relevant to the causation 
issue. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evidence 401. Mr. 
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Sennewald's testimony regarding Smith's improper training methods 
was relevant because it would have demonstrated that laxity in 
training and monitoring of shoplifting cases permeated Smith's 
managerial hierarchy. (R. 1245 at 335-42). Mr. Sennewald also 
would have testified that if proper training and monitoring 
procedures had been followed, the incident in this case would not 
have occurred. (R. 1245 at 336). Knowledge of the origin of 
Smith's inept and inadequate training program supports the 
contention that Smith's negligence was the proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. 
The trial court excluded evidence from Mr. Sennewald 
regarding the apportionment of fault between Smith's and Burnett 
because it concluded the evidence invaded the province of the 
jury. (R. 1245 at 361-62). The Court of Appeals sustained the 
trial court. 820 P.2d at 491. However, the court reads Rule 704 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence too narrowly. 
Rule 704 states: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
In this case the Court of Appeals characterized Mr. Sennewald's 
excluded testimony as a "legal conclusion" and cited a prior 
Court of Appeals case, Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition that "legal conclusions" are 
excludable. However, in neither Davidson nor this case does the 
Court of Appeals define "legal conclusion." 
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In defining the parameters of the admissibility of legal 
conclusions, one authority (who terms such conclusions 
"inadequately explored legal criteria") warns of a pitfall: 
Care should be taken in interpreting the 
concept of "inadequately explored legal 
criteria" and applying Rule 403 not to lose 
sight of the fact that "the so-called 
'ultimate issue' rule is specifically 
abolished" by Rule 704 and that the standard 
by which to judge opinions, lay and expert, 
"is to admit them when helpful to the trier 
of fact." 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 704.1 at 663 (3d ed. 
1991) (footnotes omitted). Even a cursory reading of the Court 
of Appeals' opinions in this case and Davidson reveals that the 
Court of Appeals continues to try to breathe life into the long-
dead ultimate issue rule and thus, applies the wrong standard to 
such cases. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals dogged adherence to the 
ultimate issue rule is contrary to the most recent pronouncement 
of this Court. In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991), 
issued before the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, this 
Court gave a very broad interpretation to Rule 704. In Span, the 
only evidence that a fire was a criminal act was the opinion 
testimony of one of the fire investigators. However, that 
evidence was held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. 819 
P.2d at 332. The only limitation imposed on Rule 704 by the Span 
Court was that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 819 
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P.2d at 332 n.l. The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case is 
simply inconsistent with Span. 
Graham has defined when an opinion is helpful to the trier 
of fact: 
An opinion of a lay or expert witness is 
helpful (1) when an expression of the 
witness1 knowledge can be conveyed in no 
other form, (2) where an accurate, total 
impression was formed by a witness who is 
unable to account for all the details upon 
which it is based, or (3) most importantly 
where an accounting of the details by itself 
alone cannot accurately convey the total 
impression held by the witness. 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence. § 704.1 at 663 (3d ed. 
1991). In this case an accounting of the details could not 
accurately convey Mr. Sennewald's total impression of the case. 
Therefore, the evidence would have been admissible had the 
correct standard been applied. Accordingly, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the trial court excluded relevant evidence of 
proximate cause and then justified the erroneous direction of a 
verdict and an erroneous jury instruction at least partially 
because of the lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals first 
concluded that the trial court had erroneously directed a verdict 
but then, in an unprecedented action, held the error harmless 
based on the lack of evidence and the consequences of the 
erroneous instruction. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
rationalized the erroneous exclusion of some evidence by 
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referring to its conclusion on the directed verdict issue. 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of July, 1992. 
oCCjio^C 
Richkrd B. McKeown 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and forgoing to be mailed by United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, this I day of July, 1992, to the 
following: 
Christopher A. Tolboe 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MAYBE 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Richard B. McKeown 
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ADDENDUM A 
CRISTOPHER A. TOLBOE, No. 3678 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
Counsel for Defendant 
Smith's Management Corporation 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)53 3-8505 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
JOHN CLYDE HANSEN, No. 5286 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Co-Counsel for Defendant 
Smith's Management Corporation 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)5 31-7 888 
RlEDBtSTKfCTCfl'JBT 
Third Judicfal District 
OCT 3 1 1990 
By. . ^ . . . N i i . ^ > * » U L T ! 
»«puty Cie/k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant, 
AMMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-3662 
Judge Scott Daniels 
On January 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, and 31, 1990, the 
above-entitled action came on for trial before the above-
entitled Court and a jury, the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
District Judge, presiding. Plaintiff Pearl H. Steffensen 
was represented by Richard B. McKeown and Bradley H. Parker 
of Parker, McKeown & McConkie, and defendant Smith's 
Management Corporation was represented by Christopher A. 
Tolboe of Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey and Stephen 
G. Morgan of Morgan & Hansen. After both parties had 
rested, the issues were submitted to the jury on a special 
verdict, which was answered as follows: 
WE THE JURY, after having considered 
all of the evidence presented to us at 
trial and after having considered all of 
the instructions given to us by the 
Court, hereby answer the following 
questions, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Was Smith's 
Management Corporation negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," 
sign, date and return this verdict. If 
you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then 
answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the negligence 
of Smith's Management Corporation a 
proximate cause of any injuries sustained 
by Pearl Steffensen? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," 
sign, date and return this verdict. If 
you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then 
answer Question No. 3. 
Based upon the above answers to the special verdict, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that plaintiff take nothing, that the action be 
dismissed on the merits, no cause of action, and that 
defendant Smith's Management Corporation recover its costs 
of action from plaintiff Pearl H. Steffensen in the amount 
of $11,188.56. 
DATED this ^  day of Fe&g-uajr.y« 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Scott Daniels 
District Judge 
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Pearl H. STEFFENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORA-
TION, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 91021O-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 29, 1991. 
Customer brought action against store, 
seeking damages for injuries sustained in 
connection with store employees' attempts 
to apprehend a shoplifter. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Dan-
iels, J., entered judgment for store, and 
customer appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) erro-
neous jury instruction that store's negli-
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gent failure to deter shoplifter was not 
proximate cause of customer's injuries was 
harmless; (2) any error in instructing jury 
on issue of foreseeability of acts of specific 
shoplifter was harmless; (3) any error in 
excluding evidence of store's failure to 
train employees was harmless; and (4) ex-
pert testimony regarding relative fault of 
tort-feasors was properly excluded. 
Affirmed. 
1. Trial e=*145 
Trial court's ruling that store's failure 
to deter shoplifter was not proximate cause 
of injuries to customer that resulted when 
store employees were chasing shoplifter 
through store attempting to apprehend 
him, was most accurately characterized as 
partial directed verdict for purposes of re-
view. 
2. Trial <s=>142 
Directed verdict is only appropriate 
when trial court is able to conclude that 
reasonable minds would not differ on facts 
to be determined from evidence presented. 
3. Appeal and Error <$=»927(7), 997(3) 
Directed verdict cannot stand when, 
reviewing evidence in light most favorable 
to losing party, there is reasonable basis in 
evidence and inferences to be drawn there-
from that would support judgment in los-
ing party's favor. 
4. Negligence =^>1 
A negligence claim requires plaintiff to 
establish that defendant owed plaintiff a 
duty, that defendant breached duty, that 
breach of duty was proximate cause of 
plaintiffs injury, and that there was in fact 
injury. 
5. Negligence <&=>56(1.7, 1.12), 61(1) 
"Proximate cause" is efficient cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by efficient intervening cause, 
necessarily sets in operation factors that 
produce injury and without which result 
would not have occurred; there can be 
more than one proximate cause of injury so 
long as each is contributing factor in caus-
ing injury. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Negligence <3=»136(25) 
Question of proximate cause is gener-
ally for jury. 
7. Negligence <3=*136(25) 
Proximate cause may only be deter-
mined by trial judge as matter of law if 
there is no evidence to establish causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury 
speculation, or if reasonable persons could 
not differ on inferences to be drawn from 
evidence on proximate causation. 
8. Negligence <&=>62(3) 
More recent negligent act may break 
chain of causation and relieve prior negli-
gent actor from liability under proper cir-
cumstances, but if subsequent negligent 
act is foreseeable to prior actor, both acts 
are concurring causes and prior actor is not 
absolved of liability. 
9. Negligence <£»62(1) 
A "superseding cause," sufficient to 
become proximate cause of final result and 
relieve defendant of liability for original 
negligence, arises only when intervening 
force was unforeseeable and may be de-
scribed with the benefit of hindsight, as 
extraordinary. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Negligence <£=>62(3) 
Fact that final act which produces inju-
ry is criminal conduct of third party does 
not preclude finding that earlier negligent 
act was proximate cause of injury if crimi-
nal conduct was, under the circumstances, 
reasonably foreseeable. 
11. Negligence <&=*62(1) 
Negligent actor cannot rely on its own 
subsequent acts of negligence to break 
chain of causation between earlier act of 
negligence and injury; only unforeseeable 
acts of another constitute intervening prox-
imate cause. 
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12. Negligence <&»62(1) 
Any negligence in store employees' ap-
prehension of shoplifter and subsequent 
chase through store, directly resulting in 
customer's injuries, did not break chain of 
proximate causation between customer's in-
juries and any earlier negligence of store 
employees' in failing to deter shoplifter. 
13. Negligence <s=>50 
Store was under duty to take reason-
able measures to protect customers from 
injuries resulting from store's dealing with 
shoplifters, where employee manuals advo-
cated safe handling of shoplifters, thus 
demonstrating that shoplifting was fore-
seeable in that particular store. 
14. Appeal and Error <£»1032(1) 
Appellant has burden of demonstrating 
that error was prejudicial, that is, there 
was reasonable likelihood that error affect-
ed outcome of proceedings. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 61. 
15. Appeal and Error «=»1061.4 
Any error by trial court in granting 
partial directed verdict by instructing jury 
that store's negligent failure to deter shop-
lifter was, as a matter of law, not proxi-
mate cause of customer's injuries, was 
harmless since jury's verdict would not 
have differed had trial court not granted 
the partial directed verdict. 
16. Appeal and Error <8=>842(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews challenges to 
jury instructions under correctness stan-
dard. 
17. Appeal and Error <&=1068(1) 
Any error in instructing jury regarding 
acts of specific shoplifter, rather than shop-
lifters in general, on question of foresee-
ability that customer would have been in-
jured as result of store employees' negli-
gence in chasing shoplifter around the 
store, was harmless since question of fore-
seeability went to issue of negligence and 
jury found store negligent. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 61. 
18. Appeal and Error e»1008.1(8), 1032(2) 
Challenges to trial court's evidentiary 
rulings, including exclusion of expert testi-
mony, are reviewed under deferential clear 
error standard; appellant bears burden of 
demonstrating that excluded evidence could 
have influenced jury to render different 
verdict. 
19. Appeal and Error <®=>1056.4 
Any error in trial court's exclusion of 
evidence relating to failure of store to train 
it employees regarding proper handling of 
shoplifters was harmless where jury found 
that employee negligence in apprehending 
and chasing shoplifter was not the proxi-
mate cause of customer's injuries. 
20. Evidence <s=>506 
Expert testimony regarding relative 
fault of two tort-feasors was properly ex-
cluded as an impermissible legal conclu-
sion. 
Richard B. McKeown and Bradley H. 
Parker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Christopher A. Tolboe, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a 
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffen-
sen was injured in defendant Smith's 
Management Corporation's ("Smith") gro-
cery store by a shoplifter attempting to 
flee from the store's management The 
jury found Smith was negligent, but the 
negligence was not the proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On appeal, Mrs. 
Steffensen asserts the trial court improper-
ly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train its 
employees as to the appropriate methods to 
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting 
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) 
charged the jury on the law of foreseeabil-
ity; and (3) excluded certain expert testi-
mony. We affirm. 
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FACTS 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett en-
tered a Smith's grocery store to shoplift 
beer and cigarettes. Gary Canham, the 
store's front-end manager, observed Mr. 
Burnett take beer and cigarettes from the 
store's shelves. As Mr. Burnett walked 
toward the front of the store, Mr. Canham 
suspected Mr. Burnett might attempt to 
leave the store without paying for the mer-
chandise. Mr. Canham immediately in-
formed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King 
manager, and together the two watched 
Mr. Burnett from the office area at the 
front of the store. As Mr. Burnett walked 
toward the front of the store, he noticed 
the two managers and felt they were 
watching him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett 
got in line at a checkout stand. As soon as 
Mr. Burnett felt he was no longer being 
watched, he got out of line and walked 
quickly toward the door with the merchan-
dise. 
The two managers then confronted Mr. 
Burnett and asked him to come with them 
to their office. As the three walked to-
ward the office, Mr. Rompus called out to 
another employee at the front of the store, 
telling her to call the police. As the group 
reached the office area, Mr. Burnett turned 
and "broke" toward the exit, dropping the 
beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. Rom-
pus yelled "stop him—see if you can stop 
him," in an effort to engage the assistance 
of others. Responding to the call for help, 
another employee attempted to stop Mr. 
Burnett by assuming a football blocking 
stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett dodged 
this employee, turning in a different di-
rection, and as he did so, ran directly into 
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced" 
off this employee directly into the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Steffensen, who was standing at the 
customer service counter writing a check. 
The force of the collision knocked Mrs. 
Steffensen to the ground, where she struck 
her head on the tile floor. Mrs. Steffensen 
was taken to the hospital and has since 
suffered severe "stroke-like" paralysis to 
the entire left side of her body. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen com-
menced this action against Smith, claiming 
Smith was negligent in dealing with Mr. 
Burnett and that this negligence caused 
her injury. At the conclusion of the pre-
sentation of evidence, defense counsel 
moved for a partial directed verdict on the 
grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett from shoplifting could not, as a 
matter of law, be a proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge 
granted the motion and incorporated this 
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At 
the conclusion of trial, the judge submitted 
written interrogatories to the jury. After 
deliberation, the jury found Smith had act-
ed negligently, but Smith's negligence did 
not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's 
injury. 
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is 
the trial court improperly granted Smith a 
partial directed verdict on the element of 
proximate causation. During the trial, 
Mrs. Steffensen proceeded on two theories 
of negligence. First, Mrs. Steffensen as-
serted Smith had been negligent in failing 
to train its employees to use techniques to 
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting and, 
alternatively, that Smith's employees negli-
gently failed to utilize these techniques in 
dealing with Mr. Burnett. Second, Mrs. 
Steffensen claimed Smith was negligent in 
chasing and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett 
after he broke away and ran. Mrs. Stef-
fensen argued that both of these acts of 
negligence endangered the safety of 
Smith's customers and ultimately caused 
her injuries. 
[1] At the close of evidence, Smith 
asked the trial judge for a partial directed 
verdict, ruling that as a matter of law, even 
if its employees had been inadequately 
trained about the need for deterrence and 
failed to utilize deterrence, such failure 
was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Stef-
fensen's injury. The trial court granted 
Smith's request and instructed the jury 
that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop 
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be 
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considered by the jury:1 
You have heard testimony regarding 
events that occurred prior to the time of 
the stop of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett. 
You are instructed that none of the ac-
tions of the Smith's employees prior to 
the stop and detention proximately 
caused plaintiffs injuries. 
Therefore, you must not take this testi-
mony into consideration when deliberat-
ing and making your decision. 
[2,3] A directed verdict is only appro-
priate when the court is able to conclude 
that reasonable minds would not differ on 
the facts to be determined from the evi-
dence presented. Management Comm. v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-
98 (Utah 1982). A directed verdict cannot 
stand when, reviewing the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the losing party, 
"there is a reasonable basis in the evidence 
and in the inferences to be drawn there-
from that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Pen-
rod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 
1987). 
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's 
jury instruction concerning pre-apprehen-
sion evidence was improper because rea-
sonable minds could differ as to whether a 
failure to "deter" Mr. Burnett from shop-
lifting was the proximate cause of her inju-
ries. 
[4,5] In Utah, a negligence claim re-
quires the plaintiff to establish four ele-
ments: that the defendant owed the plain-
tiff a duty; that defendant breached the 
duty (negligence); that the breach of the 
duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs 
1. Although the trial judge both granted a direct-
ed verdict and incorporated his ruling in the 
court's jury instructions, we conclude the ruling 
is most accurately characterized as a partial 
directed verdict. A directed verdict makes a 
determination as to an element of a cause of 
action, and takes such determination from the 
purview of the jury—as was done here. The 
Utah Supreme Court characterized the same ac-
tion of a trial judge as a directed verdict in 
Harris v. Utah Transit Autk, 671 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action 
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial 
judge instructed the jury that if they found that 
the defendant jeep driver should have observed 
injury; and that there was in fact injury. 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 
1991). Proximate cause is "that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause), produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. 
It is the efficient cause—the one that nec-
essarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury." State v. Lawson, 
688 P.2d 479, 482 & n. 2 (Utah 1984). Fur-
ther, there can be more than one proximate 
cause of an injury so long as each is a 
concurrent contributing factor in causing 
the injury. See Anderson v. Parson Red-
E-Mix Paving Co., 2A Utah 2d 128, 467 
P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jacques v. Farrimond, 
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963). 
[6,7] It is well established that the 
question of proximate cause is generally 
reserved for the jury. Godesky v. Provo 
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984); 
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 
P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App.1989), cert de-
nied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Only in 
rare cases may a trial judge rule as a 
matter of law on the issue of proximate 
causation. 
This principle is illustrated by several 
Utah Supreme Court decisions. In Harris 
v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1983), the passenger of a jeep 
brought an action against a bus company 
and the jeep driver for injuries sustained in 
a traffic accident The trial court granted 
the bus company a directed verdict, in-
structing the jury that if they found the 
jeep driver should have observed the bus 
prior to the accident, they must find, as a 
matter of law, that the jeep driver was the 
the bus, then they must conclude, as a matter of 
law, the jeep driver was the sole proximate 
cause of the collision, thereby precluding liabili-
ty stemming from the bus driver's actions. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
that this instruction was in fact a directed ver-
dict and treated it as such. The trial judge's 
ruling in this case is indistinguishable from the 
ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise con-
sider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict 
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos 
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1982) (motion for directed verdict tests 
the sufficiency of the evidence). 
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sole proximate cause of the accident. On 
appeal, the plaintiff claimed that a jury 
could infer that the bus negligently contrib-
uted to the accident and pointed to allega-
tions that the bus stopped too rapidly, 
failed to drive out of the lane of traffic, 
and had faulty brake lights. Id, at 220. 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the 
plaintiff and reversed the directed verdict. 
The Harris court held it improper for the 
trial judge to have taken the issue of proxi-
mate cause from the jury. The court ex-
plained: "Where the evidence is in dispute 
including the inferences from the evidence, 
the issue should be submitted to the jury." 
Id. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defen-
dant summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause in an action where the 
plaintiff had been injured in an automobile 
accident. The plaintiff claimed he was un-
able to see approaching traffic in executing 
a left-hand turn because a van owned by 
the defendant utility company negligently 
blocked his view by remaining in the inter-
section, and this was an intervening proxi-
mate cause of the accident. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the sum-
mary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause. The court held that the issue of 
proximate cause may only be taken from 
the jury where reasonable minds could not 
differ as to what "was or was not the 
proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 365 
n. 4. The court concluded that "in a situa-
tion involving independent intervening 
cause, the primary issue is one of the 
foreseeability of the subsequent negligent 
conduct of a third person, and in this 
case, [the issue of proximate cause] must 
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at 
365 (emphasis added). 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court's summary 
judgment for defendant on the issue of 
proximate causation because the court 
found no evidence of proximate cause and 
determined that, without evidence, the is-
sue would have been left to juror specula-
tion. In Mitchell, dependents of a mur-
dered hotel guest brought a wrongful 
death action against the hotel after the 
deceased had been unexplainedly murdered 
in his hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to 
prove that the hotel management was neg-
ligent in its security measures and that 
such negligence proximately caused the 
murder. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld the trial judge's summary 
judgment for the defendant. The court 
held that because there was no evidence as 
to how the murderer entered the de-
ceased's room, plaintiffs had failed to show 
a factual connection between the negligent 
security measures and the murder. The 
Mitchell court recognized that the murder-
er could have entered the room in a number 
of ways, many of which would have had no 
connection with the hotel's security mea-
sures, including by invitation of the de-
ceased. Because plaintiffs bore the burden 
to show defendant's conduct was a "sub-
stantial causative factor that led to the 
[guest's] death," id. at 246, and because 
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other 
than mere speculation as to how the mur-
derer got in the room, summary judgment 
on the issue of proximate causation was 
proper. 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause 
should be taken from the jury only where: 
(1) there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury 
speculation, or (2) where reasonable per-
sons could not differ on the inferences to 
be derived from the evidence on proximate 
causation. Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of 
America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d 
1040, 1047 (1990) (en banc). 
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because 
there was not an unbroken causal line be-
tween this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's 
injury. Specifically, Smith argues the act 
of apprehending Mr. Burnett, Mr. Bur-
nett's decision to run, and Mr. Burnett's 
physical encounter with Smith's employees, 
were, as a matter of law, intervening proxi-
mate causes and therefore broke the chain 
of causation flowing from its failure to 
deter. 
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[8-10] Smith correctly asserts that "a 
more recent negligent act may break the 
chain of causation and relieve the liability 
of a prior negligent actor under the proper 
circumstances." Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544. 
However, if the subsequent negligent act is 
foreseeable to the prior actor,-both acts are 
concurring causes and the prior actor is not 
absolved of liability. Id. The issue is 
whether the subsequent intervening con-
duct, either criminal or negligent, was rea-
sonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris, 
671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause, 
sufficient to become the proximate cause of 
the final result and relieve defendant of 
liability for his original negligence, arises 
only when an intervening force was unfore-
seeable and may be described with the ben-
efit of hindsight, as extraordinary.,, Rob-
ertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2 The fact that 
the final act which produces the injury is 
the criminal conduct of a third party does 
not preclude the finding that an earlier 
negligent act was the proximate cause of 
injury if the criminal conduct was, under 
the circumstances, reasonably foreseeable. 
Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697 
P.2d at 246. 
[11,12] First, Smith cannot rely on its 
own subsequent acts of negligence to 
break the chain of causation between an 
earlier act of negligence and the injury. 
Only the unforeseeable acts of another con-
stitute an intervening proximate cause. 
See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801 P.2d 
468, 472 (Ct.App.1990); People v. Gentry, 
738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo.1987); State v. 
Neher, 52 Wash.App. 298, 759 P.2d 475, 
476 (1988), affd, 112 Wash.2d 347, 771 P.2d 
330 (1989). To hold otherwise would allow 
tortfeasors to escape liability by commit-
ting additional acts of negligence following 
an initial breach of a duty. Therefore, 
Smith's apprehension of Mr. Burnett and 
the subsequent chase through the store did 
not break the chain of causation. 
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a 
matter of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts fol-
2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah App.1990) (in wrongful death action, trial 
court improperly took proximate cause from 
jury on grounds that nurses' failure to notify 
lowing apprehension broke the chain of 
causation between Smith's failure to deter 
Mr. Burnett and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Substantial evidence before the jury indi-
cated that Smith could have reasonably 
foreseen a customer would be injured by a 
shoplifter's decision to run, particularly 
when, instead of deterring the shoplifter, 
Smith chose to "play cat and mouse" with 
him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen presented 
evidence on this theory of causation. A 
closer question is whether any reasonable 
juror could conclude that the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn from it 
show Smith's failure to deter was a contrib-
uting cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced 
substantial expert testimony that, in deal-
ing with shoplifters, deterrence measures 
prevent shoplifting and thus promote cus-
tomer safety. During trial, Mrs. Steffen-
sen presented testimony from security and 
shoplifting experts who testified that 
Smith's employees failed to use reasonable 
means to handle Mr. Burnett, a suspected 
shoplifter, sufficient to protect the safety 
of the store's customers. These experts 
identified two specific and generally accept-
ed techniques that retail stores employ 
when dealing with shoplifters and which 
Smith failed to implement. First, the ex-
perts testified that a retail store should 
take steps to "deter" a suspected shoplifter 
from carrying out his or her plan by taking 
such affirmative action as making direct 
eye contact with the suspected shoplifter, 
approaching the suspected shoplifter and 
offering assistance, and calling for security 
over the public intercom system. Second, 
the experts testified that a retail store 
should also train its employees to use care 
when apprehending a shoplifter. The ex-
perts agreed that employees should not 
chase or use force with a shoplifter who 
becomes violent or flees. These experts 
testified that stores employ, or should em-
ploy, such techniques primarily to protect 
the safety of their customers and to pre-
vent incidents precisely like the one which 
doctors of patient's worsening condition was 
not proximate cause because of subsequent in-
tervening negligence). 
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occurred in this case.3 In addition, Mrs. 
Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's em-
ployee training manuals which advocated 
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters.4 
Mr. Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he 
thought Smith's employees were watching 
while he was in the store. He went to get 
in the checkout line and waited there until 
he believed he was not being watched. 
Further, Mrs. Steffensen's experts testified 
that approximately five percent of all shop-
lifters, when, apprehended, run. They like-
wise testified that the proper use of deter-
rence techniques can reduce this number 
by reducing the number of shoplifters as a 
whole. 
[13] Thus, we are hesitant to uphold 
the trial court's ruling that, as a matter of 
law, Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett 
was not a contributing proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. There was prob-
ably sufficient evidence produced from 
which a reasonable juror could infer that 
Smith's failure to deter was a negligent 
act,5 as it would have been reasonably fore-
3. Smith's experts also agreed that these tech-
niques—deterrence and refraining from using 
force or chasing the shoplifter—are valid securi-
ty methods. Their testimony, however, asserted 
that Smith's employees had been adequately 
trained in these procedures and properly fol-
lowed the procedures during the Burnett shop-
lifting incident. 
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements 
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in 
handling shoplifters: 
Make sure that employees on the sales floor 
are greeting and making eye contact with 
customers, especially those who are acting 
suspiciously. Make use of the intercom sys-
tem by calling for security from time to time. 
Very effective tool, it gives the potential shop-
lifter an uneasy feeling that security is in the 
store. 
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its 
employees regarding the importance of custom-
er safety in handling shoplifters: 
Our company policy is that no employee is to 
take any action in the apprehension of a shop-
lifter which will bring harm to himself, to 
other employees, or to customers. The most 
important thing to remember about appre-
hending a shoplifter is that we do not want 
anyone injured. There is nothing in the store 
that is worth a person getting hurt for. Use 
common sense, if the situation can't be prop-
erly controlled let the shoplifter go and at-
tempt to get a license number. 
seeable to an adequately trained employee 
that his or her decision to apprehend the 
shoplifter in a crowded store could have led 
to a customer's injury. 
[14,15] However, this does not end our 
inquiry. If the trial court's partial directed 
verdict was harmless error, we need not 
reverse. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61 (1991); 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989). On appeal, the appellant has the 
burden of demonstrating an error was prej-
udicial—that there is a "reasonable likeli-
hood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. 
Further, in determining whether a trial 
court's error was harmful, we must look 
beyond the mere fact of error and consider 
in totality all the evidence and proceedings 
below. See, e.g., Anderson v. Toone, 671 
P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 1983) (erroneous jury 
instruction not reversible error when con-
sidered in light of all instructions and evi-
dence). Although normally we would be 
reluctant to uphold an erroneous directed 
5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding 
Smith owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty to take rea-
sonable precautions to protect her from the 
criminal acts of third parties was correct. Since 
trial, the Utah Supreme Court has visited the 
issue of a shopowner's duty to protect custom-
ers from the criminal acts of third parties. See 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1991). In Dwiggins, the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted section 344 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, stating landowners have a duty to 
business invitees to take reasonable steps to 
protect invitees from the criminal acts of third 
parties where such acts are reasonably foreseea-
ble. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry 
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a 
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins 
is distinguishable because the store in question 
was the most frequently shoplifted store in the 
Smith's chain. Further, the fact that Smith's 
employee manuals advocate the safe handling 
of shoplifters demonstrates Smith did, in fact, 
foresee such criminal acts. Therefore, we be-
lieve the trial judge properly found that because 
customer injury from shoplifters was foreseea-
ble, the law imposed a duty on Smith to take 
reasonable measures to protect its customers 
from injuries resulting from dealing with shop-
lifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 
P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987) (store owner had a 
duty to take reasonable security measures to 
protect customers where store had been subject 
of armed robbery ten times in past three years) 
(relied on by Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n. 1). 
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verdict on harmless error grounds, in this 
case we cannot ignore the fact that the 
jury's verdict would not have differed had 
the trial judge not granted Smith's partial 
directed verdict. 
At trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented sub-
stantial evidence of Smith's negligence: the 
store's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shop-
lifting, the negligent apprehension and 
holding of Mr. Burnett, and the improper 
pursuit of Mr. Burnett once he ran for the 
door. The trial court's partial directed ver-
dict removed from the jury's consideration 
only the portion of this evidence relating to 
Smith's actions before Mr. Burnett's appre-
hension. In returning a verdict for the 
defendant on the remaining evidence, the 
jury found that although Smith had acted 
negligently, the negligence did not proxi-
mately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. 
Therefore, the jury must have concluded 
that either: (1) the post-apprehension negli-
gence was too attenuated and remote from 
the injury to constitute the proximate 
cause, or (2) Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee 
was an unforeseeable superseding proxi-
mate cause of the injury. We cannot see 
how the jury would have reached a differ-
ent conclusion had it been allowed to con-
sider acts Smith performed, or failed to 
perform, prior to apprehending Mr. Bur-
nett. Accordingly, we find it highly unlike-
ly the jury would have changed its proxi-
mate cause decision had the trial judge 
submitted to them the issue of Smith's 
failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting. 
Therefore, we find the trial court's partial 
directed verdict on the issue of proximate 
causation to be, at most, harmless error. 
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
[161 Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the 
trial court incorrectly stated the law with 
regard to foreseeability when it instructed 
the jury concerning her second theory of 
negligence—the post-apprehension chase. 
We review challenges to jury instructions 
under a "correctness" standard. See 
Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 
774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App.1989). 
[17] The trial court's jury instruction 
number thirty-two charged the jury that: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a cus-
tomer which the defendant and its em-
ployees could have reasonably anticipat-
ed as the natural consequences of their 
actions, if any, even though they were 
not able to anticipate the particular inju-
ry which did occur. In determining what 
is foreseeable, you must determine that 
the actions by Burnett were predictable 
by Smith's employees and not just a 
mere possibility. 
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction im-
properly focused on the particular acts of 
Mr. Burnett, rather than focusing on shop-
lifters in general. We agree that the spe-
cific identity of the shoplifter is irrelevant 
to the question of foreseeability. See 
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 (foreseeability 
that criminal act will occur establishes 
duty). However, it is unnecessary for us 
to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's 
claim because any error committed by the 
trial judge was harmless. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 61 (1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 
(Utah 1989). The question of foreseeability 
goes to the issue of negligence, and the 
jury found Smith negligent. Therefore, 
any error in defining foreseeability did not 
affect the jury's verdict 
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY 
[18] Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of er-
ror is the trial judge improperly excluded 
portions of her expert testimony. First, 
the trial court forbade one of Mrs. Steffen-
sen's experts from testifying about Smith's 
employee training practices as they related 
to the way its employees handle shoplift-
ers. Second, the trial court did not allow 
Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an opinion 
as to the relative proportion of fault be-
tween Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges 
to evidentiary rulings, including the exclu-
sion of expert testimony, are reviewed un-
der a deferential "clear error" standard. 
See Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 
1230 (Utah App.1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 
P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.1990). Further, 
an appellant bears the burden of demon-
strating that the excluded evidence could 
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have influenced the jury to render a differ- "[questions which allow a witness to sim-
ent verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d ply tell a jury what result to reach are not 
744, 746 (Utah App.1991). permitted." Id. at 1231. A witness may 
testify as to the defendant's actions, includ-
A. Testimony On Employee Training j n g whether the defendant acted with care; 
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court however, the witness may not consider all 
should have admitted expert testimony con- the facts and render a final legal conclu-
cerning Smith's failure to adequately train sion. We find apportionment of fault be-
lts employees regarding the proper han- tween parties to be exactly this type of 
dling of shoplifters, including techniques impermissible legal conclusion. It is for 
for deterring shoplifting. At trial, the the jury to place a legal proportion on the 
judge did not permit Smith to introduce relative faults of the parties. Therefore, 
this expert testimony on the grounds that we hold that the trial court's exclusion of 
Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett could expert testimony regarding the relative 
not have been the proximate cause of the proportion of fault between Smith and Mr. 
injury, and therefore the testimony was Burnett was correct, 
irrelevant. 
[19] Our resolution of the proximate 
cause issue relating to shoplifter "deter-
rence" mandates a finding that if this rul-
ing was error, the error was harmless. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of any training 
evidence relating to Smith's employees 
chasing Mr. Burnett was also harmless as 
the jury found Smith negligent in its appre-
hension and chasing of Mr. Burnett. 
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault 
[20] Mrs. Steffensen's final argument 
is that her expert witness should have been 
allowed to render an opinion concerning the 
relative fault of Smith and Mr. Burnett. 
Smith contends the trial court's ruling was 
correct because the apportionment of fault 
requires the expert to render a legal con-
clusion and is thus inadmissible under Utah 
law. We agree with Smith that the appor-
tionment of fault requires a legal opinion 
and, therefore, such a determination should 
be reserved for the jury. 
This court recently considered the ques-
tion of what expert opinions are permissi-
ble as going to the "ultimate issue,"6 and 
what expert opinions are inadmissible as 
"legal" conclusions. See Davidson, 813 
P.2d at 1230-32. In Davidson, we held the 
trial court properly excluded an expert 
opinion which concluded that the defendant 
was negligent. In doing so, we stated that 
6. 'Testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, even if the trial judge im-
properly invaded the province of the jury 
by granting Smith a partial directed verdict 
on the issue of proximate causation, such 
error was harmless given the jury's finding 
that Smith's subsequent negligent acts 
were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Stef-
fensen's injury. Further, any error in de-
fining "foreseeability" for the jury was 
rendered harmless by the jury's finding 
that Smith was negligent. Finally, the trial 
court correctly excluded expert testimony 
which would have improperly rendered a 
legal conclusion as to the proportion of 
fault between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Ac-
cordingly, we affirmi the jury verdict for 
defendant. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
decided by the trier of fact." Utah R.Evid. 704 
(1991). 
ADDENDUM C 
•JIIX\-LIII\. n r . r . i i j l i i 
I. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING; 
A. TO INFORM ALL STORE EMPLOYEES ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF SHRINK 
AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS EVERYONES RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL 
OR PREVENT SHRINK. 
II. DEFINTION OF SHRINK: 
A. SHRINK IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALL OF THE MERCHANDISE THAT 
WE SIGN FOR AT THE BACK DOOR AND THAT WHICH GOES OUT THE FRONT 
DOOR AT FULL RETAIL. EVERYTHING THAT IS LOST IN BETWEEN THAT 
WE DO NOT SELL AT THE FULL RETAIL PRICE IS SHRINK. IN VERY 
SIMPLE TERMS SHRINK IS UNNECESSARY LOSS WHICK REDUCES OR ELIM-
INATES PROFIT. 
B. IN THE GROCERY BUSINESS OUR PROFIT MARGIN IS 1%. AFTER YOUR 
STORE HAS PAID ALL OF ITS OPERATING COSTS THE MOST WE CAN MAKE 
IS 1% PROFIT. IN OTHER WORDS FOR EVERY $100.00 WORTH OF 
MERCHANDISE WE SELL WE CAN ONLY HOPE TO MAKE ONE DOLLAR. IF 
THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH SHRINK IN YOUR STORE IT REDUCES THAT 
NARROW 1% PROFIT MARGIN. IN ORDER TO STAY IN BUSINESS AND 
BUILD BEAUTIFUL STORES WHICH ALSO PROVIDE ENJOYABLE CLEAN 
PLACES TO WORK WE MUST ALL BE INVOLVED IN ELIMINATING SHRINK. 
C. LAST YEAR THE INTERMOUNTAIN REGION WHICH YOU ARE A PART 
OF LOST A TOTAL OF IN SHRINK. THIS FIGURE IS 
FOR THE GROCERY AND DRUGKING DEPARTMENTS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE 
PERIMETER DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS THE BAKERY, PHARMACY, PRODUCE, 
AND MEAT. WE DISCOVER WHAT OUR SHRINK IS BY TAKING INVENTORIES. 
THE GROCERY AND DRUGKING DEPARTMENTS TAKE INVENTORY THREE TIMES 
A YEAR WHILE THE PERIMETER OR PERISHABLE DEPARTMENTS INVENTORY 
EVERY MONTH. 
III. CAUSES OF SHRINK; 
A. SHRINK CAN BE BROKEN INTO FOUR BASIC AREAS FOR CONTROL. 
1. 15% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY SHOPLIFTING. HOW DO WE 
CONTROL THIS? 
a. WE HAVE FOUND THAT IN MOST CASES IT IS NOT EFFECTIVE 
TO HIRE A SHOPLIFTING AGENT, HOWEVER WE DO IN SOME 
STORES THAT SUFFER EXTREME LOSS. ON THE AVERAGE IT 
COSTS APPROXIMATELY $10.00 FOR EVERY $2.00 WORTH OF 
MERCHANDISE RECOVERED BY A SHOPLIFTING AGENT, THAT 
IS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. FOR THE MOST PART WE RELY 
ON YOU TO PREVENT SHOPLIFTING. 
b. MAKE SURE THAT EMPLOYEES ON THE SALES FLOOR ARE 
GREETING AND MAKING EYE CONTACT WITH CUSTOMERS 
ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY. 
c. MAKE USE OF THE INTERCOM SYSTEM BY CALLING FOR SE-
CURITY FROM TIME TO TIME. VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL, IT 
GIVES THE POTENTIAL SHOPLIFTER AN UNEASY FEELING 
THAT SECURITY IS IN THE STORE. 
d. PROCECUTE ALL SHOPLIFTERS THAT ARE CAUGHT. THERE 
WILL BE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS, BECAUSE OF AGE, SUCH AS 
JUVENILES UNDER 13 OR THE VERY ELDER. NEVER RELEASE 
A JUVENILE WHO HAS BEEN CAUGHT SHOPLIFTING, EXCEPT 
m I Jv ^EXHIBIT 
TO THEIR PARENTS, POLICE OR RESPONSIBLE ADULT. 
e. WE SHOULD ALWAYS GET A MANAGEMENT LEVEL PERSON 
INVOLVED IN MAKING THE ACTUAL ARREST. NEVER TAKE 
A CUSTOMERS WORD FOR OBSERVING A SHOPLIFTING UNLESS 
THEY ARE WILLING TO STAY AND EXPLAIN TO THE POLICE 
WHAT THEY OBSERVED. (DISCUSS ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR 
A VALID ARREST). 
f. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER ABOUT APPREHEND-
ING A SHOPLIFTER IS THAT WE DO NOT WANT ANYONE IN-
JURED. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE STORE THAT IS WORTH 
A PERSON GETTING HURT FOR. USE COMMON SENSE, IF THE 
SITUATION CAN'T BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED LET THE 
SHOPLIFTER GO AND ATTEMPT TO GET A LICENSE NUMBER. 
2. 15% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY VENDORS AND SALESMEN WHO 
CALL ON OUR STORES. (TOSS THE QUESTION OUT TO THE GROUP, 
"HOW CAN THESE PEOLE CAUSE US SHRINK?") 
a. MOST OF THIS LOSS CAN BE CONTROLLED BY FOLLOWING 
GOOD RECEIVING PRATICES AT THE BACK DOOR. 
b. DO NOT ALLOW SALESMAN TO REMOVE ANY BOXES THROUGH 
FRONT OR BACK DOORS WITHOUT BEING CHECKED. LAUNDRY 
BAGS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE STORE WITHOUT BEING 
CHECKED, WE HAVE FOUND A HAM OR SEVERAL STEAKS INSIDE 
OF THESE. 
C. CHECK LARGE BRIEF CASES SALESMAN CARRY IN AND OUT OF 
STORE. 
d. NO ONE BUT STORE EMPLOYEES ARE ALLOWED TO USE TRASH 
COMPACTORS. MANY SALESMAN HAVE BEEN CAUGHT THROWING 
AWAY CREDITABLE MERCHANDISE. 
e. REMEMBER THE MAJORITY OF THE VENDORS AND SALESMAN 
ARE GOOD HONEST PEOLE WHO DO A LOT FOR US AND SHOULD 
ALWAYS BE TREATED WITH PROFESS IONI LI SM. IT IS THE 
TEN PERCENT THAT CAUSE THE PROBLEM. 
3. 10% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED FROM DAMAGED AND SPOILED MER-
CHANDISE. 
a. IS DAMAGE BEING CAUSED BY THE FREIGHT CREW. ARE 
CASES BEING THROWN HALF WAY DOWN THE AISLE. DOES 
THE STOCKER KNOW HOW TO PROPERLY USE A BOX CUTTER. 
BEGIN CLEAN-UP IMMEDIATELY ON DAMAGED CASES, ONE 
BROKEN BOTTLE OR JAR IN A CASE IS NO REASON TO LOSE 
THE WHOLE CASE. 
b. BROKEN, DAMAGED OR SPOILED MERCHANDISE IS NEVER TO 
BE THROWN AWAY WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE GROCERY 
MANAGER, DRUGKING MANAGER OR THE RECEIVING CLERK. 
WE CAN RECEIVE FULL CREDIT FROM THE VENDOR ON MOST 
OF THESE ITEMS, 
C. A CLEAN AND PROPERLY MAINTAINED SPOILS SECTION IS 
TO BE SET-UP AND WORKED DAILY. 
d. ANYTIME YOU OBSERVE PERISHABLE ITEMS THAT CUSTOMERS 
.««i, uiin Diun±nu UUT Vt' PLACE, PLEASE RETURN THEM 
IMMEDIATELY TO THEIR PROPER DEPARTMENT, SUCH AS 
FROZEN, MEAT, PRODUCE. IT DOES NOT MATTER IF YOU 
WORK IN THAT DEPARTMENT OR NOT, PROFITABILITY OF 
THE STORE IS A TEAM EFFORT. 
60% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY EMPLOYEE THEFT OR ERROR. 
WE PREFER TO BELIEVE THAT THE BIGGEST PART OF THE 60% 
IS CAUSED BY ERROR, HOWEVER EMPLOYEE THEFT IS A REALITY 
BASED ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE LOSE EACH YEAR DUE TO 
AN ACT OF DISHONESTY. FIRST WE WILL DISCUSS SOME OF THE 
ERRORS THAT CAUSES SHRINK. ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL 
AREAS IN THE STORE WHERE ERROR MUST BE ELIMINATED IS ON 
THE FRONT END AT THE CHECKSTAND. 
a. PRODUCE CHARTS ON ALL CHECKSTANDS. 
b. CHECKER AIDS AND UNMARKED ITEMS LISTED UP ON ALL 
CHECKSTANDS WITH CURRENT PRICES. 
C. ARE PROPER PRICE CHECK PROCEDURES BEING FOLLOWED OR 
IS THE GUESSING GAME BEING PLAYED. 
1. WHEN AND HOW ARE PRICING ERRORS BEING CORRECTED. 
2. KEY CARRIERS NEED TO BE NOTIFIED ON ALL SCAN 
ERRORS SO ITEM CAN BE CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY. 
ALSO ALL ITEMS GIVEN AWAY DUE TO SCAN ERRORS 
MUST BE KEPT TRACK OF. 
d. ARE CHECKERS SPLIT UP TO COVER BOTH ENDS UP FRONT. 
1. ARE UNUSED CHECKSTANDS CHAINED OFF WHERE FIRE 
DEPARTMENT ALLOWS. CARTS AND CHAINS IN THE 
EVENING HOURS. 
2. CHECKERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE THEIR REGISTER 
IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ORDER, AS A RESULT, CHANCE 
OF ANY ITEMS BEING PUSHED THROUGH WILL BE MINI-
MIZED. 
e. ARE GO BACKS BEING HANDLED PROPERTY. ARE GO BACKS 
GOING BACK TO THE SHELF OR ARE THEY PUSHED INTO A 
BACKROOM. 
f. HOW DO CHECKERS HANDLE MERCHANDISE ON THE BOOTOM OF 
THE CART. WHERE POSSIBLE IT SHOULD ALL COME UP ON 
THE CHECKSTAND, BUT IN ALL CASES IT MUST BE LIFTED 
UP TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT NOTHING IS CONCEALED UNDER-
NEATH IT. 
g. ARE VOIDS AND OVERRINGS BEING PROPERLY HANDLED. 
APPROVAL BEING OBTAINED WHERE REQUIRED. 
1. NO CUSTOMER SIGNATURE WILL BE REQUIRED ON VOIDS, 
OVERRINGS, AND BOTTLE REFUNDS UNDER FIVE DOLLARS 
($5.00). 
2. CUSTOMER SIGNATURE AND PHONE NUMBER WILL BE 
REQUIRED ON ALL GREEN SLIPS INVOLVING CASH BACK 
TO THE CUSTOMER AND GREEN SLIPS OVER FIVE DOL-
LARS ($5.00). 
3. KEY CARRIERS APPROVAL REQUIRES ON ALL GREEN SLIPS 
OF $2.00 OR MORE. 
h. MAKE SURE THAT ALL REGISTERS HAVE DETAIL TAPE AND CUS-
TOMER RECEIPT TAPE. SHOULD BE CHECKED AT THE BE-
GINNING AND AT THE END OF EVERY SHIFT. 
i. CHECK ALL CASHIERS TO SEE THAT EACH ARTICLE IS 
TOUCHED AND RANG. AND NOT RANG AS GROUP WITHOUT 
CHECKING PRICE OF EACH ITEM. 
j. CHECK TO MAKE SURE THAT CASHIERS AND BAGGERS ARE 
PLACING CASH REGISTER TAPES INTO EVERY ORDER. 
k. MAKE SURE ALL CASHIERS CHECK THEIR SCALES DAILY AND 
THAT THEY KNOW HOW TO USE THEM. RE-WEIGH ALL ITEMS 
WITH LOOSE LABELS FROM PRODUCE & MEAT DEPT. DIS-
COURAGES ANY LABEL SWITCHING. 
1. CHECK THAT STORE POLICY ON EMPLOYEE PURCHASES ARE 
STRICTLY ADHERED TO. ARTICLES PURCHASED MUST BE 
TAKEN FROM THE STORE IMMEDIATELY. AT NO TIME WILL 
A CHECKER EVER CHECK OUT THEIR OWN GROCERIES OR A 
MEMEBER OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY. 
m. MAKE SURE THAT UNWANTED AND RETURNED PERISHABLE 
MERCHANDISE IS RETURNED TO THE DEPARTMENTS IMMEDIATE-
LY. 
n. CHECK BOTTLE CARTS TO SEE THAT BOTTLES ARE REMOVED 
REGULARLY FROM THE FRONT OF THE STORE TO THE BOTTLE 
STORAGE AREAS. DO NOT LET BOTTLES STAND AROUND IN 
SHOPPING CARTS IN THE FRONT OF THE STORE. POSITION 
BOTTLE CARTS AWAY FROM WHERE CUSTOMERS PICK UP THEIR 
EMPTY CARTS. WE DO NOT WANT TO BUY BACK BOTTLES MORE 
THAN ONCE. 
o. SERVICE LEVEL IS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM AND A MUST FOR 
CONTINUED CUSTOMER LOYALTY. ARE YOUR CUSTOMERS LEAV-
ING THE CHECKSTAND WITH A SMILE AND A THANK YOU FROM 
OUR CHECKERS? 
EMPLOYEE THEFTi (BE POSITIVE AND TACTFUL IN DEALING WITH 
THIS SUBJECT, BUT BE SERIOUS). EVERY YEAR THERE ARE MANY 
EMPLOYEES WHO ARE TERMINATED AND SEVERAL WHO ARE PUT IN 
JAIL FOR THEFT OR DISHONESTY. A LOT OF TIME AND MONEY 
HAS GONE INTO TRAINING OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU. AS 
AN EMPLOYEE YOU ARE AN ASSET TO SMITH'S AND WE DO NOT WANT 
TO LOSE YOU ESPECIALLY FOR SOMETHING AS DUMB AS THEFT. THE 
SECURITY DEPARTMENT IN THIS COMPANY DOES NOT TAKE PRIDE IN 
TERMINATING EMPLOYEES, WE WANT TO PROTECT OUR ASSETS NOT 
LOSE THEM. 
a. ANY ACT AMOUNTING TO THEFT REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT 
WILL RESULT IN TERMINATION AND POSSIBLY PROSECUTION. 
WE MAINTAIN A VERY HARDLINE STAND ON THIS, THERE ARE 
HQ SECOND CHANCES. REMEMBER THE 1% PROFIT MARGIN, IF 
AN EMPLOYEE TAKES A 250 ITEM WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT WE 
HAVE LOST THE PROFIT ON $25.00 WORTH OF SALES. 
b. THE MOST IMPORTANT RULE TO REMEMBER IS "NO ITEM IS TO 
BE CONSUMED. USED. OR TAKEN FROM THE STORE BEFORE IT 
IS PAID FOR." THIS POLICY IS BLACK & WHITE, NO EX-
CUSES SUCH AS I WAS GOING TO PAY FOR IT LATER, WILL 
EVER BE ACCEPTED. 
C. PAYING FOR PRODUCT WHEN GOING ON BREAK. UNDER NORMAL 
CONDITIONS YOUR BREAK TIME WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE 
nrwuMi- ur TJ.JUS IT TAKES TO PAY FOR YOUR PURCHASES, 
USE COMMON SENSE, DO NOT SPEND TEN MINUTES SHOPPING. 
d. ALWAYS HAVE A SALES RECEIPT FOR ANY MERCHANDISE IN 
YOUR POSSESSION. 
e. THERE ARE NO EMPLOYEE DISCOUNTS. THE STORE MANAGER 
IS THE ONLY PERSON AUTHORIZED TO APPROVE ANY DISCOUNTS. 
f. EMPLOYEE PURCHASES MUST BE CONSUMED OR REMOVED FROM 
THE STORE IMMEDIATELY. EXAMPLE: IF AN EMPLOYEE DOES 
THEIR SHOPPING ON THEIR LUNCH HOUR THEY CANNOT HOLD 
THEIR GROCERIES IN THE BACKROOM OR DELI-COOLER UNTIL 
QUITTING TIME. 
g. DO NOT TOLERATE THEFT IN YOUR STORE. IF YOU OBSERVE 
THAT A FRIEND IS EATING OR DRINKING WITHOUT PAYING, 
TRY TO GET IT STOPPED BY SAYING SOMETHING TO THEM. 
PEER PRESURE CAN BE A POSITIVE THING AS WELL AS 
NEGATIVE. IF THIS DOESN'T WORK THEN REPORT IT. 
SHOULD YOU OBSERVE SOMETHING IN YOUR STORE THAT YOU 
DO NOT FEEL IS RIGHT, YOU ARE INVITED TO REPORT IT 
ANONYMOUSLY. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF 
AND WILL NEVER BE FORCED TO DO SO UNLESS YOU WANT TO. 
h. THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT IS A SERVICE ORGANIZATION 
WITHIN THE COMPANY. IF THERE IS ANY WAY WE CAN HELP 
WITH ANY TYPE OF PROBLEM OR JUST ANSWER A QUESTION 
PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL. (MAKE AVAILABLE A 
STACK OF YOUR BUSINESS CARDS) 
MISC; 
A. SUPPLY POLICY. 
B. POLICY ON SALE OF BEER TO MINORS. 
C. ARMED ROBBERY. 
1. DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE IMPORTANCE OF "COOPERATE AND STAY 
ALIVE." 
THANK EVERYONE FOR THEIR ATTENDANCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEETING. 
NOTE: BEFORE THE MEETING PUT TOGETHER A BASKET FULL OF GOOD EX-
AMPLES TO DEMONSTRATE THE TOPICS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT. 
ADDENDUM D 
SHOPLIFTING 
4. 
S. 
IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STORE EMPLOYEES TO TZ\ T" 
PROTECT MERCHANDISE FROM THEFT. 
HOWEVER, OUR COMPANY POLICY IS THAT NO EMPLOYEE IS TO TAKE 
ANY ACTION IN THE APPREHENSION OF A SHOPLIFTER WHICH WILL 
BRING HARM TO HIMSELF, TO OTHER EMPLOYEES OR TO CUSTOMERS. 
ALL EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO EXERCISE COMMON SENSE IN THIS 
AREA AND TO ALWAYS INVOLVE A MEMBER OF THE STORES MANAGEMENT 
TEAM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO APPREHEND ANY SHOPLIFTER. 
YOU MUST SEE THE PERSON* ACTUALLY TAKE THE MERCHANDISE FROM 
THE SHELF OR DISPLAY AND KNOW WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THEY ARE 
LEAVING THE STORE WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT. 
THE BEST RULE TO FOLLOW IS TO BE SURE BEFORE YOU TAKE ANY 
ACTION. IF YOU HAVE ANY DOUBT IN YOUR MIND ABOUT WHETHER A 
PERSON HAS ACTUALLY STOLEN SOMETHING, IT IS FAR BETTER TO 
TAKE NO ACTION THAT TO WRONGLY ACCUSE A CUSTOMER OF THEFT. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a person removes merchandise from your store without paying 
for it, you are entitled to recover those items. 
It is rr.ost important to remember, however, that a person is not 
necessarily guilty of shoplifting just because he die net pay 
for certain items-
For a person to be found guilty of the crime of shoplifting it^  
is necessary to be able to prove that the person, in fact, 
intended to steal. 
It is not a crime to forget to pay for something. The proof 
required to make the act of taking a crime, is the formal prcof, 
obtained and presented according to strict rules of evidence, 
which will satisfy all of the procedural and constitutional 
requirements imposed by the courts. 
The person who apprehends a shoplifter must have a basic know-
ledge of those requirements. He must have them in mind each 
time he contemplates taking a shoplifter into his custody. 
In the past eight years Commercial Service Systems has made a 
detailed study of some 85,000 shoplifting cases. 
Under 30% of those shoplifters were turned over to the police* 
A pertinent question is "Has it possible to handle the 70% 
which were released with any less care and caution than was 
required in handling the 30% which were prosecuted?" 
The answer, from the standpoint of policy, must be that all 
shoplifters, prosecutions and non-prosecutions, adults and 
juveniles must be handled with equal care and caution. 
The obvious reason is that the person who makes the appre-
hension often changes his mind about the course of action he 
is to take after he has apprehended and interrogated the sub-
ject. 
The apprehending official finds himself in a difficult if not 
untenable position if he has ignored the basic rules outlined 
in this policy guide. 
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DECISION TO ARREST 
Only the manager should have the responsibility for apprehending 
a shoplifter, but he may delegate the responsibility to those 
employees considered by him to be competent to handle such 
matters, 
1. Security recommends the manager should delegate this 
authority to all key carriers and department heais 
but only after he is satisfied that they are qualified 
to carry out the responsibility. Other employees can 
also be assigned this responsibility, again if the 
manager is satisfied that the employee is qualified 
to carry out the responsibility. Each nanacer is to 
keep this rr.ar.ual on file and all persons authorize 
to apprehend shoplifters must read and sign this 
manual. The date that said person was appointed 
must also be recorded in this manual. Remember, this 
manual must be updated whenever key carriers or depart-
ment heads are transferred. 
CITIZEN'S ARREST 
A citizen who sees a misdemeanor committed in his presence may 
arrest the individual who committed the offense. 
It is important to note that this arrest is legal only if it is 
made by the citizen who sees the offense committed« 
If an employee other than the manager sees the offense committed 
he must make the arrest* The manager must have delegated the 
authority to arrest to that employee or he must have confidence 
in the employee's ability to judge that a crime has been conmitted 
and then accompany thte employee who will make the arrest. 
RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY DIRECTORS KHEN OUTSIDE AGENTS OR 
AGENCIES ARE HIRED TO WORK SHOPLIFTING IN OUR STORES 
Each director will maintain a manual on file showing the date 
each agent or agencies were employed making agent or agencies 
sign that they have read and understand the manual and also 
that they have been given a copy of this manual. 
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p!^tYOU_APPREHEND A SHOPLIFTER. 
7 YOU MUST SEE THE SHOPLIFTER 
• TAKE YOUR (STORE) PROPERTY.. I £
 Y 0 U
 MUST SEE HIM CONCEAL IT~ 
t L O T ^U S T SEE THAT "HE"001$ NOT PAY FOR IT... A YOU MUST" APPREHEND HIM 
^ OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHMENT... 
(California only, past the check-
s,tands in other states) . 
n 
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LEGAL STEPS TO APPREHENSION 
You must see the shoplifter take your property. You may 
then testify that it was, in fact, your merchandise. 
You must see the shoplifter conceal the merchandise on his 
person. 
Concealment: contributes greatly toward establishing that 
the shoplifter intended to steal the merchandise and did 
not merely forget to pay for it. 
You must watch the shoplifter continuously and see that 
the merchandise is not "ditched." 
If you are diverted so that there is a break in your 
surveillance of the shoplifter, you are taking a poorly 
calculated risk to later apprehend that person. 
You must be able to testify personally, of your own 
knowledge, that the merchandise was not paid for. 
It is not sufficient to ask the person operating the cash 
register if the merchandise was paid for. 
If you did not see the shoplifter fail to pay for the 
merchandise in question, then you do not have personal 
knowledge that a crime has been committed and you do not 
have the authority to make a citizen's arrest. 
Apprehend the shoplifter outside the store . . • either 
on public property, the parking lot: or the sidewalk, 
(California only) . Itfs past the checkstands in all 
other states. 
By permitting the shoplifter to exit the store prior to 
making the arrest you have allowed the person to go that 
much further in establishing his true intent to steal. 
Apprehend the shoplifter in all states, except California, 
after he passes the check out counters. /jThe safest place 
to arrest is between the checkstands and exit doors. You ^  
are on your own grounds.and will be able to get additional] 
help if needed. / 
Where a camera bar is located at the front of a store, be 
certain that they have passed by any opportunity of paying 
for the merchandise there, and are headed to the door. 
THE SHOPLIFTER IN YOUR CUSTODY 
When apprehending the shoplifter, be sure, be firm and be 
positive. 
Identify yourself by name and as a store employee. 
Always take one or rr.ore enployees with you when you rake the 
apprehension. 
There is safety in numbers and at least one other person car. 
act as corroborating witness. 
Address the shoplifter politely and directly. Words such as 
the following are effective: 
"Ma*m, I am the store manager. You have a can of our hair 
spray in your purse which you did not pay for. Please come 
back into the store with me so that we can straighten this 
out.M 
Reasonable force can be employed if the shoplifter refuses 
to return, but your safety and the safety of those you are 
responsible for must always be foremost in your mind. 
Have the employee who is backing you up follow to see that 
the shoplifter does not discard the stolen merchandise. 
Attempt to recover at least one item when you first stop the 
shoplifter. 
Your most important asset will be an attitude which conveys 
confidence and self assurance. If you show doubt or in- • 
decision the shoplifter will sense your uncertainty and 
exploit it to your disadvantage. 
If the shoplifter escapes before you recover your merchandise, 
telephone the police. 
Give description and the description and license number of 
the automobile if you were able to obtain it. 
Inform the police, and-make sure they understand, that you 
are making an advisory report only and that you DO NOT 
want the person apprehended. 
When the police pick up such a suspect they must do so on 
their own and for their own investigation. At that point 
the suspect has always discarded the evidence and it is 
difficult if not impossible to convict a shoplifter unless 
you can produce the merchandise you recovered from him. 
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QUESTIONING THE SHOPLIFTER 
1. Your purpose in interrogating the shoplifter is three-fold: 
A. To recover all of your merchandise. 
B. To obtain a confession fron the shoplifter. 
C. To obtain the shoplifter's signature on the forr which 
releases the store and all parties involved in the 
apprehension from Civil Liability. 
2. Utilize a private roor?. off the sales floor. 
3. Always have a witness present. If the shoplifter is a fe.T.ale 
have a female witness present. 
4. Being able to name the item and the place of concealment 
will go a long way toward convincing the shoplifter that he 
has been caught redhanded. 
5. Instruct the shoplifter to place all of the items they have 
not paid for on the table or desk. 
6. A positive attitude and persistence on your part will 
usually produce results. 
If the shoplifter refuses to produce the stolen merchandise 
you may decide to call for uniformed police assistance. 
Be very alert that the shoplifter does not ditch the 
merchandise while you are waiting for assistance to arrive. 
7. Most shoplifting subjects appear to cooperate because they 
are interested in getting their predicament resolved with 
as little trouble as possible. 
8. Most shoplifters will claim that it is the first time they 
have stolen merchandise. Admissions of prior thefts are not 
greatly important as one should not accept restitution for 
prior thefts and if prosecuted the shoplifter will be con-
victed of the current offense only. 
9. The only way restitution for prior thefts should be accepted 
is at a later time at the company's main office with proper 
representation on both sides to foreclose entirely the 
possibility of any claim of extortion. 
10. A standard civil release form which also contains all of 
the information pertinent to the circumstances of the theft 
should be used routinely and should be kept on hand in all 
stores. 
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COMPLETING THE CIVIL RELEASE FORM 
(Also known as SMC Shoplifing Apprehension Form) 
Ask the shoplifter for identification-
Fill out ell blanks and answer all questions en the release 
form. It is impossible to try to remember details at some 
later time. Make release in duplicate, one to the store 
files and or.e mailed to iecunty. 
After you have completed the release form ask the shoplifter 
to read it aloud. 
When you are satisfied that the shoplifter understands the 
release form ask hin to sign. 
Language such as the following will be helpful in obtaining 
the signature: 
"If I have the information all correct I would like for you 
to indicate so by putting your signature on this line. You 
may use i?.y pen" . . . At that point hand the shoplifter your 
Pen. 
If the shoplifter indicates that they are reluctant to sign 
because they do not want to adr.it in writing that they stole 
something, explain that the stateinent is not .an admission of 
theft but rather an agreement that they did leave the store 
without paying and that it was reasonable for you to recover 
your merchandise. 
If you have already made the decision to prosecute the 
shoplifter, obtaining the signature on the form is less 
important. 
A criminal conviction is perhaps the best kind of protection 
against civil liability in a shoplifting case. 
If you intend to release the shoplifter, the civil release 
is of great importance. 
If the shoplifter refuses to sign the release the person 
should be prosecuted unless there are circumstances which 
make it obvious to you that it would be difficult to obtain 
a conviction. 
MANAOCMrNT CO*r*OI 
Sitonif fine AITKLMINSIUU 
^ ^ j w SMITH'S CMr  *r RAT«ON ^ 
Oate / g ^ ' c P / 
l# the undoesiqned, do voluntarily admit and state that on this dote 1 entered 
the <Ss/f/77rr /fyvo A'As*? located at the address indicated below, 
where without making payment therefor. I took on<i carried from the possession 
of said store, without consent, the following property: 
Store Nunbcr Street City State 
Item Price Item Price 
Total J ? . / / 
I, the undersigned, in signing this statement and surrendering the aforc-'ent io^ed 
items, do so voluntarily and of my own free will and without force or tnrc3ls 
or pronises of any kind and with the understanding that I fully release Sr.ifh's 
Management Corporation ond all its agencies and representatives individually, 
and personal ly from a 11 type of civi I IiabiIi ty. 
>/<rsr?ss? <rvtX «y^rlrr 
Signed;^ 
Wi tness £ srsr? r &jiS J srt~ witness , 
Name T i t l e Name T i t l e 
Last Name first
 y Middle £? 
Maiden Name and Other Names Used: 
Street Address ??S~ <fc STWTf C i ty cfi 4. <T. State CS7&7J* 
Telephone Number Occupation Employed by: . .
 r - __ _ 
Social Secur i ty Number Oriver's License Oate of Month Oay Year 
Sex Race Age * Height Weight Hafr Eyes 
* G> i«J /? £'/" /?*. #**/ &£<* 
Oescrlbe Method Of Operation: Sl/sVC?/?/} si/ / V ^ V I f /?SJ*SS? 
CL> 
«.. 
7. 
Purse 
Professional 
Accoroplice 
Statement of Subject: 
2. 
5. 
8. 
Shopping Bag 
Pocket 
Under Clothing 
3. 
6. 
9. 
Other Bag 
Price Switcher 
Other 
Was Subject Was Subject Where Was Subject Booked? Wis The Evidence 8ooked7 y 
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SITUATIONS WHERE IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO PROSECUTE 
ADULT SHOPLIFTERS 
1. The shoplifter refuses to sign the civil release form. 
2. The shoplifter has no identification. 
3. The shoplifter resists or attacks store personnel. 
4. The shoplifter appears to be under the influence of drugs., 
5. The shoplifter appears to be intoxicated. (In this case the 
police rr.ay bock the person on a drunk charge rather than a 
shoplifting charge.) 
6. The shoplifter has a prior record, 
7. The theft involves a large anount of merchandise. 
8. The person appears to be a professional shoplifter. 
A. He employs .a booster box or other device. 
B. It appears that he has other stolen merchandise in his 
vehicle. 
9. The theft involves cartons of cigarettes. 
10. The theft involves liquor-
11. The theft involves fresh meat in a quantity-which causes you 
to suspect that the stolen merchandise is to be sold. 
12. Any other unusual circumstances which cause you to believe 
that it would be wise to call the police into the case. 
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SITUATIONS WHERE IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO RELEASE ADULT 
SHOPLIFTERS INSTEAD OF INITIATING PROSECUTION 
The manager rr.ay elect to release the shoplifter instead of 
having hin becked ar.y time the civil release form has beer. 
signed or when extenuating circumstances suggest release 
rather than prosecution. 
Following are situations where judgement may indicate release:< 
1. You are convinced as a result of your observations and as 
a result of ycur interrogation that the subject honestly 
forgot to pay and cid not: intend to steal the merchandise. 
2. The subject is senile and would probably receive great 
sympathy from a jury or a judge. 
3. The subject is pregnant and would receive sympathy. 
4. The subject appears to be contrite or at least gives you 
complete cooperation following the apprehension. 
5. You have recently booked so many shoplifters that you are 
concerned about the amount of time you may have to spend 
in court. 
OUR YEARLY SURVEYS SHOW THAT SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 70% OF ALL 
SHOPLIFTERS APPREHENDED ARE RELEASED WITHOUT THE POLICE BEING 
BROUGHT INTO THE CASE. 
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PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING JUVENILE SHOPLIFTERS 
(Those under 18 years of age) 
In some stores, juveniles make up at least half of the shopliftmq 
problem. Therefore, it is obvious that the juvenile*s contribu-
tion to shoplifting losses must be treated seriously. A 
standard policy rv.ust be followed in handling all juvenile offender. 
1. The portion of the release form which contains icenifyinq 
information must be completely filled out in each case. 
The temptation with juveniles and particularly youncer ones 
is simply to recover the merchandise and eject them fron the 
store. 
2. The juvenile should be released only to his parents or to 
your local police agency. 
In California the usual procedure is for juvenile officers 
to interview the subject and check their card file for 
prior problems. 
If there are no prior problems the juvenile people release 
the subject to his parents. 
3. This procedure accomplishes the following: 
A. It makes a far greater impression on the juvenile and 
his family when the offense is handled in an official 
manner. 
B. You establish within the juvenile community the fact that 
shoplifting is not tolerated in your stores. 
C. You foreclose that rare possibility that something will 
happen to the juvenile between the time you release him 
and the time he reaches home, for which you may be blamed. 
D. You foreclose the possibility of the juvenile concocting 
an untrue story in his own defense concerning your mis-
treatment of him. 
4. Some companies have the juvenile sign the release form. The 
thought is 'that the more official the procedure seems the 
more impressed the juvenile will be. 
5. Most companies call parents directly in-many juvenile cases. 
This is perfectly acceptable anytime your judgement dictates 
that course of action. 
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SIGNING OF COMPLAINTS 
When you have a shoplifter booked, the police present the facts 
to the appropriate prosecutor. The prosecutor then issues a 
criminal complaint against the shoplifter. 
This co.T.rl::r.t rust be signed by the person who mace the citi-
zen 's arrest. 
It is good policy to ask the transporting officers where and 
when the complaint is to be signed. If they do not know, ask * 
them for the telephone number of their watch commander so that 
you can call him and inquire. 
The signing of the complaint is crucial. It must be the res-
ponsibility of the person who made the citizen's arrest. If the 
complaint is not signed the case cannot proceed and there will 
be no prosecution of the shoplifter. 
Do not rely on someone calling you with a request to appear and 
sign the complaint. Take the initiative yourself to determine 
what is necessary. 
If an oversight occurs and the complaint is not signed the shop-
lifter will probably go free and may very well bring a civil suit 
against you and your company. 
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Identii} "h* . . enrs on the outside of the package with 
the name c,i L.*C shoplifter, date, name of the person who 
made the apprehension, names of witnesses and any other 
pertinent data, 
ndce package in a safe place unti i it, is determined 
if the shoplifter pleads guilty or if a trial i s .scheduled 
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JJ. Iii case the d*^Dition of a shoplifter's case has vox 
been received within thirty days, the store manager 
should call the police and inquire Information may 
be available which wjll permit the return of the 
evidence to stock. 
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS RETAINED IN THE STORE AND YOU ARE SUMMONED 
TO TESTIFY AT A SHOPLIFTER'S "TRIAL, ALWAYS TAKE AI .L EVIDENCE 
TO COURT WITH YOU. 
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POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN APPEARING IN COURT AS A WITNESS 
Make notes of the circumstances when a shoplifter is apprehended. 
These notes should be made on the back of your civil release 
form. That way you will have them on court day. 
Review your notes prior to taking the witness stand and offer 
your notes to the prosecutor. 
Make the best impression by being neat and by dressir.c con-
servatively when appearing in court. 
Do not chew gum on the witness stand or any tine court is in 
session. 
Do not talk or visit with others while court is in session. 
While on the witness stand speak clearly and loudly enough 
so that you will not be required to repeat your answers. 
Remember you can testify only to what you saw personally. 
(No hearsay). 
Remember you cannot repeat any conversation which took place 
out of the hearing of the defendant* 
Remember you must adhere to the facts. Your conclusions or 
assumptions are net allowed as testimony. 
Answer all questions directly and in as simple terms as 
possible. 
A. The natural tendency is to be overly expansive when you 
think a question does not engender an adequate answer. 
B. Rely on the prosecutor to ask additional questions which 
will clear up any misunderstanding. 
Do not make voluntary statements while on the witness stand. 
A. Suggest to the prosecutor any testimony you have in mind 
before you take the stand. 
B. Rely on the prosecutor1 s judgement about what should be 
brought out as testimony. 
If you do not know the answer to a question, say so in a 
direct way. 
If you do not hear a question, politely ask that it be repeated. 
If you do not understand a question, say so in a direct manner. 
Do not fall into the trap of trying to match wits with defense 
counsel. 
A, Kou u i 11 ru.,1 \i\r iv^ \ >*) w i ! ! damage the impression1 yoi! 
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RESPONSIBILITY OF STORE EMPLOYEES 
It is the responsibility of store employees to try to protect 
merchandise from theft. 
However, company policy is that no employee is to take er.y 
action in the apprehension of a shoplifter which will bring 
harm to himself, to other employees or to customers. 
Each person is expected to do what he can to prevent shoplifting 
and to apprehend shoplifters when his action is consistent with 
instructions based on company policy. 
All employees are urged to exercise ordinary common sense m 
this area and to consult with a superior when there is any 
doubt about the course of action to follow. 
The best rule to follow is to be sure before you take any acti:r.. 
If you have any doubt in your mind about whether a person has 
actually stolen something, it is far better to take no action 
until you are sure. 
Make a mental note of the person. If they stole from you 
successfully on one occasion they will probably bring you more 
of their "business" and you will have the opportunity to see 
and do all that is required before you take action. 
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FOLLOWING ARE BASIC POINTS WHICH YOUR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY WILL BE INTERESTED IN 
1. That you have policy and procedures for handling shoplifters. 
2. That such policy emanates from your company's upper r.ar.ace-
ment and that it is observed by all concerned. 
3. That your security force and responsible store employees 
understand the basics of citizen's .arrest. 
4. That you are not going to use the police to try to scare 
shoplifters; that when you call uniformed officers to the 
store it is because you desire to have a shoplifter trans-
ported and booked. 
5. That once the shoplifter has been booked, you are prepared 
to follow through with the prosecution. This includes your 
signing the criminal complaint at the appropriate time and 
your producing the witnesses required by the prosecution. 
6. That you understand when uniformed officers respond to ycur 
call they do so for the purpose of transporting and booking 
the suspect and not for the purpose of making the arrest. 
1. That you understand that all calls for assistance are 
assigned a priority. A call concerning an armed robbery 
in progress will take precedence over a call concerning a 
shoplifter in custody at your store* That there may be 
delays in answering your call for this reason. 
REMEMBER THAT YOUR POLICE OFFICIALS HILL PROBABLY UNDERSTAND AND 
RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS BASED UPON YOUR APPROACH TO THEM AND IN 
RELATIONSHIP TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PROBLEMS AND LIMITA-
TIONS. 
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